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Abstract
We study a symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, where a confidential message is sent from
a transmitter to a legitimate receiver, in the presence of a helper and an eavesdropper, under a weak notion of
secrecy constraint. For this setting, we characterize the optimal secure generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF).
The result reveals that, adding a helper can significantly increase the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel. The
result is supported by a new converse and a new scheme. In the proposed scheme, the helper sends a cooperative
jamming signal at a specific power level and direction. In this way, it minimizes the penalty in GDoF incurred by
the secrecy constraint. In the secure rate analysis, the techniques of noise removal and signal separation are used.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of information-theoretic secrecy dates back to Shannon’s work of [1] in 1949. Since then,
information-theoretic secrecy has been investigated in varying communication channels, e.g., the wiretap
channels [2]–[4], multiple access channels with confidential messages and wiretap multiple access channels
[5]–[12], the broadcast channels with confidential messages [13]–[18], and the interference channels with
confidential messages [13], [19]–[39]. In those settings, the messages are transmitted over the channels
with secrecy constraints, which often incur a penalty in capacity (cf. [10], [13], [19], [24], [25], [28], [29],
[31], [33], [37], [38], [40]). One way to minimize the capacity penalty incurred by secrecy constraints
is to add helper(s) into the channels (see, e.g., [25], [33], [34], [36], [39], [41]–[45]). Specifically, the
work in [39] recently showed that adding a helper can totally remove the penalty in sum generalized
degrees-of-freedom (GDoF), in a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel.
In this work, we consider secure communications over a Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper. In this
setting, a confidential message sent from a transmitter to a legitimate receiver needs to be secure from an
eavesdropper, in the presence of a helper. The wiretap channel and its variations have been considered as
the basic channels for the investigation of information-theoretic secrecy. For example, the wiretap channel
with a helper can be considered as a specific case of an interference channel with only one confidential
message. The insights gained from the former can be very helpful in understanding the fundamental limits
of the latter. For the Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper, the work in [45] provided both inner and
outer bounds on the achievable secrecy rate at finite SNRs, where the achievability is based on unstructured
Gaussian random codes and the derived inner and outer bounds do not match in general. In the wiretap
channel with M helpers, the works in [25], [41] showed that the secure degrees-of-freedom (DoF) is
M
M+1
for almost all channel gains. The result is derived under the assumption that perfect channel state
information (CSI) is available at the transmitters. The work in [36], [42] then showed that the same secure
DoF of M
M+1
is still achievable when the eavesdropper CSI is not available at the transmitters. Another
work in [43] studied a Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, where a single antenna is equipped at
each of the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, while multiple antennas are equipped at each of the
helper and the eavesdropper. The result in [43] revealed that the secure DoF 1/2 is achievable irrespective
of the number of antennas at the eavesdropper, as long as the number of antennas at the helper is the
same as the number of antennas at the eavesdropper. In the setting of wiretap channel with a helper,
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Fig. 1. Optimal secure GDoF vs. α for the symmetric Gaussian wiretap channels with and without a helper, where α denotes the ratio
between the direct-links’ channel strength (in decibel scale) and the cross-links’ channel strength (in decibel scale). The direct-links refers
to the link from the transmitter to its legitimate receiver, as well as the link from the helper to the eavesdropper, while the cross-links refers
to the other two links, in this symmetric setting. The dash line with green color refers to the optimal symmetric secure GDoF vs. α for the
symmetric Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages (cf. [37]).
the previous DoF results were generalized to the multiple-antenna scenario where multiple antennas are
equipped at each node [33], [44]. The work in [44] used the assumption that perfect CSI is available at the
transmitters, while the work in [33] used the assumption that the eavesdropper CSI is not available at the
transmitters. In all of those previous works in [25], [33], [36], [41]–[44] (except for [45], which studied
the secrecy rate at finite SNRs), the authors considered the secure DoF performance of the channels. The
DoF metric is a form of capacity approximation. Under the DoF metric, all the non-zero channel gains are
treated equally strong, at the regime of high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). However, in the communication
channels the capacity is usually affected by different channel strengths of different links. Therefore, it
motivates us to go beyond the DoF metric and consider a better form of capacity approximation. GDoF
metric is a generalization of DoF, which is able to capture the capacity behavior when different links
have different channel strengths and is very helpful in understanding the capacity to within a constant
gap (cf. [46]). The work in [34] studied the secure GDoF and secure capacity of the Gaussian wiretap
channel with a helper, as well as the Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel, where channel gain from
the first transmitter to the eavesdropper is the same as the channel gain from the second transmitter to
the eavesdropper. Note that, the setting considered in [34] has symmetric channel gains at the wiretapper,
which is different from our setting considered in this work. Also note that, the secure GDoF upper bound
and the lower bound provided in [34] are not matched for a certain range of channel parameters. In this
work, we seek to characterize the optimal secure GDoF of a wiretap channel with a helper.
Specifically, the main contribution of this work is the optimal secure GDoF characterization of a
symmetric wiretap channel with a helper, for all the channel parameters. The result reveals that, adding
a helper can significantly increase the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel (see Fig. 1). The result is
supported by a new converse and a new scheme. The converse is derived for the wiretap channel with a
helper under the general channel parameters, i.e., the converse holds for the symmetric and asymmetric
channels. In the proposed scheme,1 the helper sends a cooperative jamming signal at a specific power
level and direction. In this way, it minimizes the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint.
In the proposed scheme, the signal of the transmitter is a superposition of a common signal, a middle
signal, and a private signal. The power of private signal is low enough such that this signal arrives at
the eavesdropper under the noise level. The power of the common signal and middle signal is above the
noise level at the receivers. However, at the eavesdropper each of the common signal and middle signal
1Although in this paper, for illustration simplicity, the achievable scheme is mainly discussed for the symmetric settings, the key ideas
could be generalized to asymmetric channels as well.
is aligned at a specific power level and direction with the jamming signal sent from the helper, which
minimizes the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint. The optimal secure GDoF is described
in different expressions for different interference regimes. For each interference regime, the power and
rate levels of the signals in the proposed scheme are set to the optimal values, so as to achieve the optimal
secure GDoF. In the secure rate analysis, the techniques of noise removal and signal separation are used
(cf. [47], [48]). The secure GDoF result derived in this work can be extended to understand the secure
capacity to within a constant gap, which will be investigated in the future work.
We will organize the rest of this work as follows. In Section II we will describe the channel model.
In Section III, the main results of this work will be provided. The converse proof will be described
in Section IV. The achievability proof will be shown in Section V and Section VI. In Section VII we
will provide the conclusion. In terms of notations, we use H(•) and I(•) to represent the entropy and
mutual information, respectively, and use h(•) to represent differential entropy. Z and Z+ are used to
denote the sets of integers and positive integers, respectively, while R is used to denote the set of real
numbers. (•)+ = max{0, •}. When f(s) = o(g(s)) is used, it suggests that lims→∞ f(s)/g(s) = 0. All
the logarithms are considered with base 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This work focuses on a Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper (see Fig. 2). In this setting,
transmitter 1 sends a confidential message to receiver 1 (the legitimate receiver), in the presence of a
helper (transmitter 2) and an eavesdropper (receiver 2). By following the common conventions in [37],
[38], [48], the channel input-output relationship of this setting is described by
y1(t) =
√
Pα11h11x1(t) +
√
Pα12h12x2(t) + z1(t) (1a)
y2(t) =
√
Pα21h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22h22x2(t) + z2(t) (1b)
where yk(t) denotes the received signal of receiver k at time t, xk(t) denotes the transmitted signal of
transmitter k with a normalized power constraint E|xk(t)|2 ≤ 1, and zk(t) ∼ N (0, 1) denotes the additive
white Gaussian noise.
√
Pαk`hk` represents the channel gain of the link from transmitter ` to receiver k,
for `, k = 1, 2. The nonnegative parameter αk` captures the link strength of the channel from transmitter `
to receiver k. hk` ∈ (1, 2] is a parameter of the channel gain. In this setting, P ≥ 1 captures the base
of signal-to-noise ratio of all the links. Since the form of
√
Pαk`hk` can describe any real channel gain
greater than 1, the above model can describe the general channels (focusing on the cases with channel
gains greater than 1) in terms of capacity approximation. In this setting, all the nodes are assumed to
know all the channel parameters {αk`, hk`}k,`.2 When we consider the symmetric case, we will assume
that
α12 = α21 = α, α22 = α11 = 1, α ≥ 0.
In this setting, transmitter 1 sends a message w to its legitimate receiver over n channel uses, where
w is chosen uniformly from the set W ,{1, 2, 3, · · · , 2nR}. When transmitting the confidential message
from transmitter 1, a stochastic function
f1 :W0 ×W → Rn
maps w ∈ W to the signal xn1 = f1(w0, w) ∈ Rn, where the randomness in this mapping is represented
by w0 ∈ W0. We assume that w0 and w are independent. At the helper (transmitter 2), another function
f2 :Wh → Rn
generates a random signal xn2 = f2(wh) ∈ Rn, where wh ∈ Wh is a random variable that is independent
of w0 and w. We assume that w0 is available at the first transmitter only, while wh is available at the
2The availability of the CSI of the eavesdropper links can be justified when the eavesdropper is a legitimate user in the network, as in
the case of interference channels with confidential messages [25], [38].
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Fig. 2. A Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, where transmitter 1 sends a confidential message w to receiver 1, in the presence of a
helper (transmitter 2) and an eavesdropper (receiver 2).
second transmitter only. We say a secure rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes with
n-length, such that the legitimate receiver can reliably decode the message w, i.e.,
Pr[w 6= wˆ] ≤  (2)
for any  > 0, and the message is secure from the eavesdropper, i.e.,
I(w; yn2 ) ≤ n. (3)
The above secrecy constraint is also known as a weak notion of secrecy constraint. We will use
C(α11, α12, α21, α22, P ) to denote the secure capacity, which is defined as the maximal secure rate that is
achievable. We will use d(α11, α12, α21, α22) to denote the secure GDoF, which is defined as
d(α11, α12, α21, α22), lim
P→∞
C(α11, α12, α21, α22, P )
1
2
logP
. (4)
GDoF is a form of the approximation of capacity. In this setting, DoF is a particular case of GDoF by
considering only one point with α12 = α21 = α22 = α11 = 1.
III. MAIN RESULT
The main result of this paper is the characterization of the optimal secure GDoF value for the symmetric
wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II.
Theorem 1. Consider the symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II, with
α12 = α21 = α and α22 = α11 = 1. For almost all channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the optimal
secure GDoF is characterized as
d(α) =

1 for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2 (5a)
2− 2α for 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 3/4 (5b)
2α− 1 for 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 5/6 (5c)
3/2− α for 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1 (5d)
α/2 for 1 ≤ α ≤ 4/3 (5e)
2− α for 4/3 ≤ α ≤ 2 (5f)
0 for 2 ≤ α . (5g)
Proof. The converse follows from Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 described in Section IV. Specifically,
Lemma 1 provides some upper bounds on the secure rate of the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper,
under general channel parameters. Corollary 2 is the GDoF result derived from Lemma 1, in the setting
of symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper. The achievability based on cooperative jamming is
described in Sections V and VI.
TABLE I
SIGNAL DESIGN FOR DIFFERENT CASES, WHERE “X” MEANS THAT THE SIGNAL WILL BE SENT AND “×” MEANS THAT THE SIGNAL
WON’T BE SENT.
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
1
2
≤ α ≤ 3
4
3
4
≤ α ≤ 5
6
5
6
≤ α ≤ 1 1 ≤ α ≤ 4
3
4
3
≤ α ≤ 2
(vc, uc) × × X X X X
(vm, up) X X X X × ×
vp X X X X × ×
Remark 1. In Fig. 1, for the wiretap channel without a helper (removing transmitter 2), the secure GDoF,
denoted by dno, is given by
dno(α) = (1− α)+ ∀α ∈ [0,∞)
(see Appendix F for details). Comparing dno(α) with d(α) in Theorem 1, one can find that adding a
helper significantly increases the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel.
Remark 2. From Fig. 1, it is not hard to verify that for all α values, the sum secure GDoF of two-user
symmetric interference channels with confidential messages is no less than the secure GDoF of symmetric
wiretap channel with a helper (surprisingly, for a large regime of 3
2
≤ α < 2, the former is the double of
the latter). This indicates that in a two-user symmetric interference channel with confidential messages,
acting one of the transmitter as a pure helper (i.e., not sending its own confidential message) does not
improve the sum secure GDoF.
Our achievability scheme is based on pulse amplitude modulation, superposition coding, cooperative
jamming, and alignment techniques. Specifically, the transmitted signal of transmitter 1 is a superposition
of a common signal (denoted by vc), a middle signal (denoted by vm), and a private signal (denoted by
vp). The power of private signal is low enough such that this signal arrives at the eavesdropper under the
noise level. The power of the common signal is higher than that of the middle signal, and both signals are
above the noise level at the receivers. The transmitted signal of the helper (transmitter 2) is a superposition
of a common jamming signal (denoted by uc) and a private jamming signal (denoted by up). The common
signal vc is aligned with the common jamming signal uc at the eavesdropper at a specific power level and
direction, while the middle signal vm is aligned with the private jamming signal up at the eavesdropper,
again, at a specific power level and direction. One difference between the common and private jamming
signals is that, the latter arrives at the legitimate receiver under the noise level. Therefore, the signal
up will not cause much interference at the legitimate receiver, while the signal uc will create significant
interference at the legitimate receiver. For the private signal, it will not require jamming signal from
the helper. Depending on different regimes of α, some signals are not needed and are thus set as empty
signals. Table I gives a summary of the signal design. Note that (vc, uc) is considered as a pair of signals,
and (vm, up) is considered as another pair of signals, due to our alignment design. With the above signal
design, our scheme achieves the optimal secure GDoF value. More details of the achievability scheme
can be found in Sections V and VI.
IV. CONVERSE
For the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II, we provide a general upper bound
on the secure rate, which is stated in the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II, letting φ1,(α12−(α22−
α21)
+)+ and φ3,min{α21, α12, (α11 − φ1)+}, the secure rate is upper bounded by
R ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−φ3 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + P φ3−φ1 |h22|2
)
+ 7.3 (6)
R ≤ 1
2
(1
2
log
(
1 +
P (α11−α21)
+
|h21|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
P (α22−α12)
+
|h12|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11|h11|2 + Pα12|h12|2
)
+ log 9
)
(7)
R ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α22+α11−α21 · |h11|
2|h22|2
|h21|2
)
. (8)
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in the following subsections. Our converse is based on genie-aided
techniques. Specifically, we enhance the setting by using the following two approaches. a) Adding noise
with a certain power to the observation of eavesdropper. See (23) later on, where y2(t) becomes y¯2(t),
which is a noisy version of y2(t). b) Adding information to the legitimate receiver. See (21) and (28) later
on. The converse also builds on some bounds on the difference of conditional differential entropy of an
interference channel (see Lemmas 3 and 4 later on). More details of the converse proof are provided in
the following subsections.
Based on Lemma 1, we provide the secure GDoF upper bound in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II, the secure GDoF is
upper bounded by
d(α11, α12, α21, α22) ≤ min
{
max{φ1, (α11 − φ3)+}+ (φ3 − φ1)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bound 1
,
1
2
(
(α11 − α21)+ + (α22 − α12)+ + max{α11, α12}
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bound 2
,
(α22 + α11 − α21)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bound 3
}
. (9)
Proof. The first bound d ≤ max{φ1, (α11−φ3)+}+(φ3−φ1)+ follows from the bound in (6). The second
bound follows from the bound in (7) and the last bound follows from the bound in (8).
The following result is a simplified version of Corollary 1 for the symmetric setting with α11 = α22 =
1, α21 = α12 = α.
Corollary 2. For the symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II, with
α11 = α22 = 1, α21 = α12 = α, the secure GDoF is upper bounded by
d(α) ≤

1 for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2
2− 2α for 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 3/4
2α− 1 for 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 5/6
3/2− α for 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1
α/2 for 1 ≤ α ≤ 4/3
2− α for 4/3 ≤ α ≤ 2
0 for 2 ≤ α .
Proof. See Appendix G.
In what follows, we provide the proof of Lemma 1. At first, for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= ` we define that
φ1,(α12 − (α22 − α21)+)+ (11)
φ2,(α11 − φ1)+ (12)
φ3,min{α21, α12, φ2} (13)
skk(t),
√
P (αkk−αk`)+hkkxk(t) + z˜k(t) (14)
s`k(t),
√
Pα`kh`kxk(t) + z`(t) (15)
x¯1(t),
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1}h21x1(t) + z¯3(t) (16)
x¯2(t),
√
P φ3 z˜2(t) + z¯4(t) (17)
and
y¯2(t),
√
P−(α21−φ3)y2(t) + z¯2(t)
=
√
P φ3h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22−(α21−φ3)h22x2(t) +
√
P−(α21−φ3)z2(t) + z¯2(t) (18)
where z˜1(t), z˜2(t), z¯2(t), z¯3(t), z¯4(t) ∼ N (0, 1) are i.i.d. noise random variables that are independent
of the other noise random variables and transmitted signals {x1(t), x2(t)}t. Let snkk,{skk(t)}nt=1,
sn`k,{s`k(t)}nt=1, x¯nk ,{x¯k(t)}nt=1 and y¯n2 ,{y¯2(t)}nt=1.
A. Proof of bound (6)
Let us focus on the proof of bound (6). For the channel defined in Section II, the secure rate is bounded
as follows:
nR = H(w)
= I(w; yn1 ) +H(w|yn1 )
≤ I(w; yn1 ) + n1,n (19)
≤ I(w; yn1 )− I(w; yn2 ) + n1,n + n (20)
≤ I(w; yn1 , sn22)− I(w; yn2 ) + n1,n + n (21)
= I(w; sn22)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+I(w; yn1 |sn22)− I(w; yn2 ) + n1,n + n
= I(w; yn1 |sn22)− I(w; yn2 ) + n1,n + n (22)
≤ I(w; yn1 |sn22)− I(w; y¯n2 ) + n1,n + n (23)
where (19) follows from Fano’s inequality; (20) results from secrecy constraint in (3), i.e., I(w; yn2 ) ≤ n
for an arbitrary small ; (21) uses the fact that adding information will not reduce the mutual information;
(22) follows from the fact that w is independent of xn2 and s
n
22 (cf. (14)); (23) stems from the fact that
w → yn2 → y¯n2 forms a Markov chain, which implies that I(w; yn2 ) ≥ I(w; y¯n2 ).
We invoke the following lemma to bound I(w; y¯n2 ) appeared in (23).
Lemma 2. For s22(t) and y¯2(t) defined in (14) and (18), the following inequality holds true
I(w; y¯n2 ) ≥ I(w; y¯n2 |sn22)−
n
2
log 14. (24)
Proof. The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix A.
Then, by incorporating the result of Lemma 2 into (23), it gives
nR− n
2
log 14− n1,n − n
≤I(w; yn1 |sn22)− I(w; y¯n2 |sn22)
=h(yn1 |sn22)− h(y¯n2 |sn22) + h(y¯n2 |sn22, w)− h(yn1 |sn22, w)
=h(yn1 |sn22)− h(y¯n2 |sn22) + h(y¯n2 , sn22|w)− h(yn1 , sn22|w) (25)
where (25) uses the identities that h(y¯n2 |sn22, w) = h(y¯n2 , sn22|w)−h(sn22|w) and h(yn1 |sn22, w) = h(yn1 , sn22|w)−
h(sn22|w). For the first two terms in (25), we have an upper bound that is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For s22(t) and y¯2(t) defined in (14) and (18), the following inequality holds true
h(yn1 |sn22)− h(y¯n2 |sn22) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−φ3 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 10.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix B.
For the last two terms in (25), we have an upper bound that is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For y2(t) defined in (1), and s22(t) defined in (14), the following inequality holds true
h(y¯n2 , s
n
22|w)− h(yn1 , sn22|w) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + P φ3−φ1|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 168. (26)
Proof. The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix C.
Finally, by incorporating the results of Lemmas 3 and 4 into (25), the secure rate is bounded by
R ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−φ3 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + P φ3−φ1 |h22|2
)
+ 7.3 + 1,n + .
Letting n→∞, 1,n → 0, 2,n → 0 and → 0, we get the desired bound (6).
B. Proof of bound (7)
Let us now prove the bound (7). Let
x˜k(t),
√
Pmax{αkk,α`k}xk(t) + z˜k(t)
and x˜nk ,{x˜k(t)}nt=1 for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= `, where z˜k(t) ∼ N (0, 1) is a virtual noise that is independent
of the other noise and transmitted signals. Recall that
s`k(t),
√
Pα`kh`kxk(t) + z`(t)
for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= ` (cf. (15)) Beginning with Fano’s inequality, the secure rate is bounded as:
nR− n1,n ≤ I(w; yn1 )
≤ I(w; yn1 )− I(w; yn2 ) + n (27)
≤ I(w; yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 , yn2 )− I(w; yn2 ) + n (28)
= h(x˜n1 , x˜
n
2 )− h(yn2 ) + h(yn1 , yn2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )− h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w) + n
≤ h(x˜n1 , x˜n2 )− h(sn21) + h(yn1 , yn2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )− h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w) + n (29)
where (27) results from a secrecy constraint (cf. (3)); (28) stems from the fact that adding information does
not decrease the mutual information; (29) follows from the derivation that h(yn2 ) ≥ h(yn2 |xn2 ) = h(sn21).
Note that y2(t) =
√
Pα22h22x2(t) + s21(t). On the other hand, we have
nR ≤ I(xn1 ; yn1 ) + n1,n (30)
= h(yn1 )− h(sn12|xn1 ) + n1,n (31)
= h(yn1 )− h(sn12) + n1,n (32)
where (30) follows from the Markov chain of w → xn1 → yn1 ; (31) results from the fact that y1(t) =√
Pα11h11x1(t) + s12(t); (32) follows from the independence between xn1 and s
n
12. Finally, by combining
(29) and (32), it gives
2nR− 2n1,n − n
≤ h(x˜n1 )− h(sn21) + h(x˜n2 )− h(sn12) + h(yn1 ) + h(yn1 , yn2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )− h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w). (33)
At this point, by following the steps from (171)-(176) in [38], we end up with
2R + 21,n − 
≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P (α11−α21)
+
|h21|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
P (α22−α12)
+
|h12|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11|h11|2 + Pα12|h12|2
)
+ log 9.
By setting n→∞, 1,n → 0 and → 0, it gives bound (7).
C. Proof of bound (8)
Bound (8) is directly from [38, Lemma 8].
V. ACHIEVABILITY
This section focuses on the symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper defined in Section II.
Note that we consider the symmetric channel mainly for illustration simplicity. The key ideas of the
achievable scheme presented in this section could be generalized to asymmetric settings as well. For this
channel, we will provide a cooperative jamming scheme to achieve the optimal secure GDoF expressed
in Theorem 1. The proposed scheme will use pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) and signal alignment.
The details of the scheme are described as follows.
1) Codebook: At transmitter 1, a codebook is generated as
B,
{
vn(w,w0) : w ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR}, w0 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR0}
}
(34)
with vn being the codewords. All the codewords’ elements are independent and identically generated
according to a specific distribution. R and R0 are the rates of the confidential message w and the confusion
message w0, respectively. The purpose of using the confusion message is to guarantee the security of the
confidential message. The message will be mapped to a codeword under the following two steps. First,
given the message w, a sub-codebook B(w) is selected, where B(w) is defined as
B(w),{vn(w,w0) : w0 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR0}}.
Second, transmitter 1 randomly selects a codeword from the selected sub-codebook based on a uniform
distribution. Then, the channel input is mapped from selected codeword vn such that
x1(t) = h22v(t) (35)
for t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where v(t) denotes the tth element of vn.
2) Constellation and alignment: In the proposed scheme, each codeword vn is generated such that
each element takes the following form
v(t) =
√
P−βc · vc(t) +
√
P−βm · vm(t) +
√
P−βp · vp(t) (36)
which suggests that the input x1 in (35) can be described as
x1 =
√
P−βch22vc +
√
P−βmh22vm +
√
P−βph22vp (37)
without the time index for simplicity (same for the next signal descriptions). For transmitter 2 (the helper),
the transmitted signal is a cooperative jamming signal designed as
x2 =
√
Pα−1−βch21uc +
√
Pα−1−βmh21up. (38)
For the above transmitted signals, the random variables vc, vm, vp, uc and up are independently (cross
symbols and times) and uniformly drawn from the corresponding PAM constellation sets
vc, uc ∈ Ω(ξ = 6γ
Q
, Q = P
λc
2 ) (39)
vm, up ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ
Q
, Q = P
λm
2 ) (40)
vp ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
Q
, Q = P
λp
2 ) (41)
where Ω(ξ,Q),{ξ · a : a ∈ Z ∩ [−Q,Q]} denotes the PAM constellation set, and γ is a finite constant
such that
γ ∈ (0, 1/20]. (42)
In Table II we provide the parameters {βc, βm, βp, λc, λm, λp} under different regimes3. If the parameters
are set as βp = ∞ and λp = 0, we will treat vp as an empty term in the transmitted signal. Similar
implication is applied to {vc, uc, vm, up} . In Fig. 3 we provide a schematic representation of the proposed
scheme, focusing on transmitter 1.
Generate
vc, vm, vp
from PAM
Generate
v from (36)
Generate
Bcodebook
with v i.i.d.
Select
B(w)
sub-codebook
Map message with
and map channel input
with (35)
B(w)
(39)-(41)
Fig. 3. A schematic representation of the proposed scheme, focusing on transmitter 1.
Given our signal design, the power constraints E|x1|2 ≤ 1 and E|x2|2 ≤ 1 are satisfied. Focusing on
the first transmitter, we have
E|vc|2 =
2× (6γ
Q
)2
2Q+ 1
Q∑
i=1
i2 =
(6γ
Q
)2 ·Q(Q+ 1)
3
≤ 72γ
2
3
E|vm|2 ≤ 8γ
2
3
E|vp|2 ≤ 2γ
2
3
(43)
3Without loss of generality, we assume that P
λc
2 , P
λm
2 and P
λp
2 are integers. Consider one example with λc = α − 1/2 −  and
P
λc
2 =
√
Pα−1/2−. When
√
Pα−1/2− is not an integer, we can slightly modify  such that
√
Pα−1/2− is an integer, for the regime
with large P .
TABLE II
DESIGNED PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT CASES, FOR SOME  > 0.
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
1
2
≤ α ≤ 3
4
3
4
≤ α ≤ 5
6
5
6
≤ α ≤ 1 1 ≤ α ≤ 4
3
4
3
≤ α ≤ 2
βc ∞ ∞ 0 0 α− 1 α− 1
βm 0 2α− 1 2α− 1 2α− 1 ∞ ∞
βp α α α α ∞ ∞
λc 0 0 4α− 3−  α− 1/2−  α/2−  2− α− 
λm α−  1− α−  1− α−  1− α−  0 0
λp 1− α−  1− α−  1− α−  1− α−  0 0
which suggests that
E|x1|2 ≤ 4× (72γ
2
3
+
8γ2
3
+
2γ2
3
) =
328
3
γ2 ≤ 328
3
× 1
400
< 1. (44)
Similarly, we have E|x2|2 ≤ 1. Note that, with our parameter design it holds true that βc ≥ α − 1 and
βm ≥ 2α− 1, which controls the average power of the transmitted signal x2 to satisfy E|x2|2 ≤ 1.
The above signal design then implies the following forms of the received signals
y1 =
√
P 1−βch11h22vc +
√
P 1−βmh11h22vm +
√
P 1−βph11h22vp
+
√
P 2α−1−βch12h21uc +
√
P 2α−1−βmh12h21up + z1 (45)
y2 = h21h22(
√
Pα−βc(vc + uc) +
√
Pα−βm(vm + up)) +
√
Pα−βph21h22vp + z2. (46)
As we can see, at the eavesdropper, the jamming signal uc (resp. up) is aligned at a specific power level
and direction with the signal vc (resp. vm). In this way, it will minimize the penalty in GDoF incurred
by the secrecy constraint, which can be seen later. Note that, with the above parameter design, the power
of signal term with vp is under the noise level at receiver 2, while the power of signal term with up is
under the noise level at receiver 1.
3) Secure rate analysis: For  > 0, let us define the two rates as
R, I(v; y1)− I(v; y2)−  (47)
R0, I(v; y2)− . (48)
Note that the wiretap channel with a helper can be considered as a specific case of the two-user interference
channel with confidential messages, by removing the message of the second transmitter. Therefore, the
result of [28, Theorem 2] reveals that the rate R defined in (47) is achievable and the message w is secure,
i.e., I(w; yn2 ) ≤ n.
In the following, we will analyze the secure rate for different cases of α.
A. Rate analysis when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2
For the first case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, the parameter design in Table II gives the following forms of the
transmitted signals
x1 =h22vm +
√
P−αh22vp (49)
x2 =
√
Pα−1h21up. (50)
Then, the received signals become
y1 =
√
Ph11h22vm +
√
P 1−αh11h22vp +
√
P 2α−1h12h21up + z1 (51)
y2 =
√
Pαh21h22(vm + up) + h21h22vp + z2. (52)
Let us now analyze the achievable secure rate expressed in (47), i.e.,
R = I(v; y1)− I(v; y2) (53)
by setting → 0. We will begin with the first term in the right-hand side of (53). With our signal design,
v is now expressed as v = vm +
√
P−αvp. In this case, the two random variables vm and vp can be
estimated from y1, with error probability denoted by Pr[{vm 6= vˆm}∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]. For the first term in the
right-hand side of (53), we have the following bound
I(v; y1) ≥ I(v; vˆm, vˆp) (54)
= H(v)−H(v|vˆm, vˆp)
≥ H(v)− (1 + Pr[{vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}] ·H(v)) (55)
=
(
1− Pr[{vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]
) ·H(v)− 1 (56)
where (54) uses the Markov property of v → y1 → {vˆm, vˆp}; and (55) follows from Fano’s inequality.
The entropy H(v) in (56) can be computed as
H(v) = H(vm) +H(vp)
= log(2 · P α−2 + 1) + log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1)
=
1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (57)
using the facts that vm ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1Q , Q = P
α−
2 ) and vp ∈ Ω(ξ = γ · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ), and that
{vp, vm} can be reconstructed from v, and vice versa. For the error probability appeared in (56), we have
the following result.
Lemma 5. Consider the case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, and consider the signal design in (37)-(42) and Table II.
Then, the error probability of the estimation of {vm, vp} from y1 is
Pr[{vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]→ 0 as P →∞. (58)
Proof. The proof is described in Appendix D. In the proof, a successive decoding method is used in the
estimation of {vm, vp} from y1.
By combining the results of (56), (57) and (58), it produces the following bound
I(v; y1) ≥ 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (59)
Note that the term I(v; y2) in the right-hand side of (53) can be considered as a penalty term in the
secure rate, incurred by the secrecy constraint. We will show that, with our scheme design using signal
alignment, this penalty will be minimized to a small value that can be ignored in terms of GDoF. It can be
seen from the received signal of the eavesdropper that, the jamming signal is aligned at a specific power
level and direction with the signal sent from transmitter 1 (see (46)). Let us now bound the penalty term
I(v; y2) as follows:
I(v; y2) ≤I(v; y2, vm + up)
=I(v; vm + up) + I(v;h21h22vp + z2|vm + up)
=H(vm + up)−H(up) + h(h21h22vp + z2)− h(z2)
≤ log(4 · P α−2 + 1)− log(2 · P α−2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
+
1
2
log(2pie(|h21|2|h22|2 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤17
))− 1
2
log(2pie) (60)
≤ log(2
√
17) (61)
where (60) results from the identity that Gaussian input maximizes the differential entropy and the fact
that vm + up ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · P−α−2 , Q = 2P α−2 ). Note that uniform distribution maximizes the entropy.
At the final step, we incorporate the results of (59) and (61) into (53) and then get the following bound
on the secure rate
R ≥ 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (62)
It implies that the secure GDoF d = 1 is achievable for this case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2.
B. Rate analysis when 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 3/4
Given the parameter design in Table II, in this case the transmitted signals are simplified as
x1 =
√
P−(2α−1)h22vm +
√
P−αh22vp (63)
x2 =
√
P−αh21up (64)
which gives the following forms of the received signals
y1 =
√
P 2−2αh11h22vm +
√
P 1−αh11h22vp + h12h21up + z1 (65)
y2 =
√
P 1−αh21h22(vm + up) + h21h22vp + z2. (66)
In this case, we can prove that the secure rate R ≥ 2−2α−2
2
logP + o(logP ) is achievable. The rate
analysis for this case follows from the steps in the previous case (cf. (53)-(62)). To avoid the repetition,
we will just provide the outline of the proof for this case. In the first step, it can be proved that
I(v; y1) ≥ 2− 2α− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (67)
by following the derivations in (53)-(59). In this case v =
√
P−(2α−1)vm +
√
P−αvp and H(v) = H(vm) +
H(vp) = 2−2α−22 logP + o(logP ). Similarly to the conclusion in Lemma 5 for the previous case, in this
case it is also true that the error probability of the estimation of {vm, vp} from y1 vanishes as P →∞. A
successive decoding method is also used in this estimation. In the second step, by following the derivations
related to (60) and (61), it can be proved that
I(v; y2) ≤ o(logP ), (68)
which, together with (67), gives the lower bound on the secure rate R ≥ 2−2α−2
2
logP + o(logP ). It
implies that the secure GDoF d = 2− 2α is achievable for this case.
C. Rate analysis when 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 5/6
Given the parameter design in Table II, in this case the transmitted signals are simplified as
x1 =h22vc +
√
P−(2α−1)h22vm +
√
P−αh22vp (69)
x2 =
√
Pα−1h21uc +
√
P−αh21up. (70)
The received signals are given by
y1 =
√
Ph11h22vc +
√
P 2α−1h12h21uc +
√
P 2−2αh11h22vm +
√
P 1−αh11h22vp + h12h21up + z1 (71)
y2 = h21h22(
√
Pα(vc + uc) +
√
P 1−α(vm + up)) + h21h22vp + z2. (72)
The rate analysis also follows (53)-(62). In this case, we can prove that the secure rate R ≥ 2α−1−3
2
logP+
o(logP ) is achievable. Again, to avoid the repetition we will just provide the outline of the proof. In the
first step, it can be proved that
I(v; y1) ≥ 2α− 1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ) (73)
by following the derivations in (53)-(59). Here we have v = vc +
√
P−(2α−1)vm +
√
P−αvp and H(v) =
H(vc)+H(vm)+H(vp) = 2α−1−32 logP +o(logP ). It is true that the error probability of the estimation of{vc, vm, vp} from y1 vanishes as P →∞. A successive decoding method is also used in this estimation.
In the second step, by following the derivations related to (60) and (61), we can prove that
I(v; y2) ≤ o(logP ). (74)
Therefore, the secure rate is bounded by R ≥ 2α−1−3
2
logP + o(logP ), implying that the secure GDoF
d = 2α− 1 is achievable.
D. Rate analysis when 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1
In this case, the transmitted signals take the same forms as in (69) and (70), and the received signals are
expressed as in (71) and (72). However, in the rate analysis, the estimation approach is different, where
noise removal and signal separation will be used. By following the previous derivations in (54)-(56), we
have the following bound
I(v; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]
) ·H(v)− 1 (75)
where the entropy H(v) in (75) can be computed as
H(v) = H(vc) +H(vm) +H(vp) =
3/2− α− 3
2
logP + o(logP ). (76)
The following lemma shows that the error probability Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}] in (75)
vanishes as P approaches infinity.
Lemma 6. Consider the case with 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1, and consider the signal design in (37)-(42) and Table II.
Then, for almost all the channel realizations {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the error probability of the estimation of
{vc, vm, vp} from y1 is
Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]→ 0 as P →∞. (77)
Proof. The proof is described in Section VI. In the proof, noise removal and signal separation are used
in the estimation of {vc, vm, vp} from y1.
The results of (75), (76) and (77) imply that the bound
I(v; y1) ≥ 3/2− α− 3
2
logP + o(logP ) (78)
holds true for almost all the channel realizations {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2. Next, by following the derivations
related to (60) and (61), it can be proved that
I(v; y2) ≤ o(logP ). (79)
Thus, we have R ≥ 3/2−α−3
2
logP + o(logP ), implying that the secure GDoF d = 3/2−α is achievable,
for almost all the channel realizations in this case.
E. Rate analysis when 1 ≤ α ≤ 4/3
In this case, the transmitted signals are simplified as
x1 =
√
P−(α−1)h22vc (80)
x2 =h21uc (81)
and the received signals are expressed as
y1 =
√
P 2−αh11h22vc +
√
Pαh12h21uc + z1 (82)
y2 =
√
Ph21h22(vc + uc) + z2. (83)
As in the previous case, the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation are also used here
for the rate analysis. In this case, the entropy H(v) is computed as H(v) = H(vc) = α/2−2 logP+o(logP ).
Following the previous derivations in (54)-(56), we have
I(v; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{vc 6= vˆc}]
) ·H(v)− 1
=
(
1− Pr[{vc 6= vˆc}]
) · α/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (84)
The lemma below provides the result on the error probability Pr[vc 6= vˆc].
Lemma 7. Consider the case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 4/3, and consider the signal design in (37)-(42) and Table II.
Then, for almost all the channel realizations {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the error probability of the estimation of
vc from y1 is
Pr[vc 6= vˆc]→ 0 as P →∞. (85)
Proof. The proof is described in Appendix E. In the proof, noise removal and signal separation are used
in the estimation of vc from y1.
The results of (84) and (85) implies that the following bound
I(v; y1) ≥ α/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (86)
holds true for almost all the channel realizations {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2. Again, it is not hard to prove that
I(v; y2) ≤ o(logP ). Together with (86), it reveals that R ≥ α/2−2 logP + o(logP ), and that the secure
GDoF d = α/2 is achievable, for almost all the channel realizations in this case.
F. Rate analysis when 4/3 ≤ α ≤ 2
In this case, the transmitted signals take the same forms as in (80) and (81), and the received signals
are expressed as in (82) and (83). Here the entropy H(v) is computed as H(v) = H(vc) = 2−α−2 logP +
o(logP ). Similar to the previous cases, we can prove that
I(v; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[vc 6= vˆc]
) · 2− α− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (87)
(cf. (84)). The probability Pr[vc 6= vˆc] in (87) is the error probability of the estimation of vc from y1. In
this case, it can be proved that uc and vc can be estimated from y1 in a successive way and the error
probability of this estimation vanishes as P →∞. The proof of this step is similar to that of Lemma 5,
and hence it is omitted here to avoid the repetition. Then, we have
I(v; y1) ≥ 2− α− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (88)
As in the previous cases, it can be proved that I(v; y2) ≤ o(logP ). Finally we have a lower bound on the
secure rate R ≥ 2−α−
2
logP + o(logP ), which implies that the secure GDoF d = 2− α is achievable in
this case.
VI. PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Given the observation y1 in (71), and with 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1, we will show that vc, uc, vm and vp can be
estimated with vanishing error probability, for almost all the channel realizations. Our focus is to prove
that vc, uc and vm can be estimated from y1 simultaneously with vanishing error probability, for almost
all the channel realizations. This proof is motivated by the proof of [38, Lemma 4], in which the noise
removal and signal separation techniques will be used. Once vc, uc and vm are estimated correctly from
y1, we can remove vc, uc and vm from y1 and then estimate vp with vanishing error probability.
Recall that vc, uc ∈ Ω(ξ = 6γQ , Q = P
α−1/2−
2 ), vm, up ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γQ , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) and vp ∈ Ω(ξ =
γ
Q
, Q = P
1−α−
2 ), for some parameters γ ∈ (0, 1/20] and → 0. Let us describe y1 in the following form
y1 =
√
Ph11h22vc +
√
P 2α−1h12h21uc +
√
P 2−2αh11h22vm +
√
P 1−αh11h22vp + h12h21up + z1
=
√
P 1−α+ · 2γ (3
√
P 1/2g2q2 + 3
√
P 2α−3/2g1q1 + g0q0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, s˜
+
√
P 1−α
(
h11h22vp +
√
Pα−1h12h21up
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, e˜
+z1
=
√
P 1−α+ · 2γs˜+
√
P 1−αe˜+ z1 (89)
where g2, g0,h11h22, g1,h12h21, e˜,h11h22vp + 1√P 1−αh12h21up, s˜, g0q0 + 3
√
P 2α−3/2g1q1 +
3
√
P 1/2g2q2 and
q2,
Q2
6γ
· vc, q1, Q1
6γ
· uc, q0, Q0
2γ
· vm, Q2,Q1,P
α−1/2−
2 , Q0,P
1−α−
2 .
In this scenario, the following conditions are always satisfied: qk ∈ Z and |qk| ≤ Qk for k = 0, 1, 2. Let
A2, 3
√
P 1/2, A1, 3
√
P 2α−3/2, A0, 1.
In this scenario with 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1, without loss of generality we will consider the case that4
Q0, Q1, Q2, A1, A2 ∈ Z+.
For the observation y1 in (89), the goal is to estimate the sum s˜ = g0(q0 + 3
√
P 1/2q2) + 3
√
P 2α−3/2g1q1
by considering the other signals as noise (noise removal). After decoding s˜ correctly, the three symbols
4The result of Lemma 6 still holds for the case when any of {Q0, Q1, Q2, A1, A2} is not integer. The proof just needs some minor
modifications. For example, when A2 is not an integer, we can modify vc and uc as vc = ηcv′c and uc = ηcu′c, where v′c, u′c ∈ Ω(ξ =
6γ
Q
, Q = P
λc
2 ), and ηc is a selected parameter such that 0 < ηc < 1 and A2ηc is an integer.
q0, q1, q2 can be estimated, based on the fact that {g0, g1} are rationally independent (signal separation,
cf. [47]), as well as the fact that q0 and q2 can be reconstructed from q0+3
√
P 1/2q2. Note that the minimum
distance of 3
√
P 1/2q2, i.e., minq2,q¯2∈Z∩[−Q2,Q2], q2 6=q¯2 3
√
P 1/2 · |q2 − q¯2|, is no less than the maximum of
2q0. To estimate s˜ from y1, we will show that the minimum distance of s˜ is sufficiently large, in order to
make the error probability vanishing. Let us define the minimum distance of s˜ as
dmin(g0, g1, g2), min
q1,q2,q˜1,q˜2∈Z∩[−Q2,Q2]
q0,q˜0∈Z∩[−Q0,Q0]
(q0,q1,q2)6=(q˜0,q˜1,q˜2)
|g0(q0 − q˜0) + 3
√
P 2α−3/2g1(q1 − q˜1) + 3
√
P 1/2g2(q2 − q˜2)|. (90)
The following lemma provides a result on the minimum distance.
Lemma 8. For the case with 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1, and for some constants δ ∈ (0, 1] and  > 0, the following
bound on the minimum distance dmin holds true
dmin ≥ δ (91)
for all the channel realizations {h11, h12, h22, h21} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ Hout, where Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 is an outage
set whose Lebesgue measure, denoted by L(Hout), has the following bound
L(Hout) ≤ 12096δ · P− 2 . (92)
Proof. For β, δ ∈ (0, 1], we define an event as
B(q2, q1, q0),{(g2, g1, g0) ∈ (1, 4]3 : |A2g2q2 + A1g1q1 + g0q0| < β}. (93)
Also define
B,
⋃
q0,q1,q2∈Z:
|qk|≤2Qk ∀k
(q0,q1,q2)6=0
B(q2, q1, q0). (94)
For 5/6 ≤ α ≤ 1, by [48, Lemma 14] we have the following bound on the Lebesgue measure of B (i.e.,
L(B))
L(B) ≤ 504β · 4
(
2 min
{Q0
A2
, Q2
}
+ Q˜2 ·min
{
Q1,
Q0
A1
,
A2Q˜2
A1
}
+ 2 min
{Q0
A1
, Q1
}
+ Q˜1 ·min
{
Q2,
Q0
A2
,
A1Q˜1
A2
})
≤ 504β · 4
(2Q0
A2
+ Q˜2 · Q0
A1
+
2Q0
A1
+ Q˜1 · Q0
A2
)
≤ 504β · 4
(
Q1 · 9Q0
A2
+
4Q0
A1
)
≤ 504β · 8Q0 max
{9Q1
A2
,
4
A1
}
≤ 504β · 8Q0 · 3P α−12
= 12096δ · P− 2 (95)
where Q˜1 = min
{
Q1, 8
max{Q0,A2Q2}
A1
}
= Q1 and Q˜2 = min
{
Q2, 8
max{Q0,A1Q1}
A2
}
= Q1·min
{
1, 8A1
A2
}
. In this
scenario, we can treat B as an outage set. When (g0, g1, g2) /∈ B, by definition we have dmin(g0, g1, g2) ≥ δ.
Recall that g2, g0,h11h22 and g1,h12h21. At this point, we define a new set Hout as
Hout,{(h11, h22, h12, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 : (g2 = g0, g1, g0) ∈ B}.
We define 1Hout(h11, h22, h12, h21) = 1 if (h11, h22, h12, h21) ∈ Hout, else 1Hout(h11, h22, h12, h21) = 0.
Similarly, we define 1B(g1, g0) = 1 if (g2 = g0, g1, g0) ∈ B, else 1B(g1, g0) = 0. Then we can bound the
Lebesgue measure of Hout as
L(Hout) =
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h22=1
1Hout(h11, h22, h12, h21)dh22dh21dh12dh11
=
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h22=1
1B(h12h21, h11h22)dh22dh21dh12dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 4
g1=1
∫ 4
g0=1
1B(g1, g0)h
−1
11 h
−1
12 dg0dg1dh12dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h12=1
L(B)dh12dh11
≤ 12096δ · P− 2 (96)
where the last step uses the result in (95).
In the rest of this section, we will consider the channel realizations (h11, h22, h12, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 that
are not in the outage set Hout. The result of Lemma 8 reveals that
L(Hout)→ 0, for P →∞.
When the channel realizations satisfy the condition (h11, h22, h12, h21) /∈ Hout, we have the following
property on the minimum distance defined in (90): dmin ≥ δ for a given constant δ ∈ (0, 1]. With this
result, we can estimate s˜ from y1 expressed in (89). For the random variable e˜ = h11h22vp+ 1√P 1−αh12h21up
appeared in (89), it is true that
|e˜| ≤ e˜max, 3/5 ∀e˜.
At this point, we have the following bound on the error probability of the estimation of s˜ from y1
Pr[s˜ 6= ˆ˜s] ≤ Pr
[
|z1 +
√
P 1−αe˜| >
√
P 1−α+ · 2γ · dmin
2
]
≤ 2 ·Q(P 1−α+2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 e˜max
)
≤ 2 ·Q(P 1−α2 (γδP 2 − 3/5)) (97)
where ˆ˜s denotes the estimate of s˜; Q(τ), 1√
2pi
∫∞
τ
exp(− z2
2
)dz; the last step stems from the result that
dmin ≥ δ. By following the fact that Q(τ) ≤ 12 exp(−τ 2/2), ∀τ ≥ 0, the result in (97) implies the
following conclusion
Pr[s˜ 6= ˆ˜s]→ 0 for P →∞. (98)
After decoding s˜ = g0(q0 + 3
√
P 1/2q2) + 3
√
P 2α−3/2g1q1 correctly, the three symbols q0, q1, q2 can be
recovered, as illustrated before in this section.
Next, we remove s˜ from y1, which leads to
y1 −
√
P 1−α+ · 2γs˜ =
√
P 1−αh11h22vp + h12h21up + z1. (99)
Since the interference term h12h21up in (99) is under the noise level, i.e., h12h21up ≤ 8γ ≤ 2/5, one can
easily prove that the the error probability for decoding vp from the observation in (99) is
Pr[vp 6= vˆp]→ 0 for P →∞. (100)
Therefore, the error probability Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}] vanishes as P approaches
infinity, for almost all the channel realizations (h11, h22, h12, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we characterized the optimal secure GDoF of a symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a
helper, under a weak notion of secrecy constraint. The result reveals that, adding a helper can significantly
increase the secure GDoF of the wiretap channel. A new converse and a new scheme are provided in
this work. The converse derived in this work holds for the symmetric and asymmetric channels. In the
proposed scheme, the helper sends a cooperative jamming signal at a specific power level and direction,
which allows to minimize the penalty in GDoF incurred by the secrecy constraint. In the secure rate
analysis, the techniques of noise removal and signal separation are used. The optimal secure GDoF is
described in different expressions for different interference regimes. For the regimes of 0 ≤ α ≤ 5/6 and
4/3 ≤ α ≤ 2, the achievable secure GDoF result holds for all the channel realizations under our channel
model. For the regime of 5/6 < α < 4/3, the achievable secure GDoF result holds for almost all the
channel realizations when P is large, under our channel model. In the future work, we will generalize
our secure GDoF result to understand the constant-gap secure capacity.
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Recall that y¯2(t) is a nosy version of y2(t), defined in (18). From chain rule, we have
I(w; y¯n2 ) = I(w; y¯n2 |sn22) + I(w; sn22)− I(w; sn22|y¯n2 )
= I(w; y¯n2 |sn22)− I(w; sn22|y¯n2 ) (101)
where (101) follows from the independence between w and sn22. For the term I(w; sn22|y¯n2 ) in (101), it can
be bounded by
I(w; sn22|y¯n2 )
=h(sn22|y¯n2 )− h(sn22|y¯n2 , w)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(s22(t)|y¯2(t))− h(sn22|y¯n2 , w, xn2 ) (102)
=
n∑
t=1
h(s22(t)−
√
P−φ3 y¯2(t)|y¯2(t))− h(z˜n2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=n
2
log(2pie)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
z˜2(t)− h21x1(t)−
√
P−α21h22z2(t)−
√
P−φ3 z¯2(t)
+ (
√
P (α22−α21)+ −
√
Pα22−α21)h22x2(t)|y¯2(t)
)− n
2
log(2pie) (103)
≤n
2
log
(
1 + |h21|2 + P−α21|h22|2 + P−φ3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤10
+ (
√
P (α22−α21)+ −
√
Pα22−α21)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
· |h22|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤4
)
(104)
≤n
2
log 14 (105)
where (102) follows from chain rule and the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (103)
uses the identity that h(z˜n2 ) =
n
2
log(2pie); (104) results from the fact that Gaussian input maximizes the
differential entropy, and that conditioning reduces differential entropy. At this point, we complete the
proof of Lemma 2.
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For s22(t) and y¯2(t) defined in (14) and (18), we have
h(yn1 |sn22)− h(y¯n2 |sn22)
≤h(yn1 |sn22)− h(y¯n2 |sn22, zn2 ) (106)
=h(yn1 |sn22)− h({y¯2(t)−
√
P−(α21−φ3)z2(t)}nt=1|sn22, zn2 )
=h(yn1 |sn22)− h({
√
P φ3h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22−(α21−φ3)h22x2(t) + z¯2(t)}nt=1|sn22, zn2 )
=h(yn1 |sn22)− h({
√
P φ3h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22−(α21−φ3)h22x2(t) + z¯2(t)}nt=1|sn22) (107)
=h(yn1 |{
√
P (α22−α21)+h22x2(t) + z′2(t)}nt=1)
− h({
√
P φ3h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22−(α21−φ3)h22x2(t) + z¯2(t)}nt=1|{
√
P (α22−α21)+h22x2(t) + z′2(t)}nt=1)
(108)
where (106) uses the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (107) follows from the
fact that zn2 is independent of {
√
P−φ3h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22−(α21−φ3)h22x2(t) + z¯2(t)}nt=1 and sn22 =
{
√
P (α22−α21)+h22x2(t) + z˜2(t)}nt=1; in (108) we replace z˜2(t) with a new noise random variable
z′2(t) ∼ N (0, 1) that is independent of the other noise random variables and transmitted signals
{x1(t), x2(t)}t; note that replacing z˜2(t) ∼ N (0, 1) with z′2(t) ∼ N (0, 1) will not change the differential
entropies in (107), due to the fact that differential entropy depends on distributions. To bound the right-
hand side of (108), we will use the result of [38, Lemma 9] that is described below.
Lemma 9. [38, Lemma 9] Let y1(t) =
√
Pα11h11x1(t) +
√
Pα12h12x2(t) + z1(t) and y2(t) =√
Pα21h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22h22x2(t) + z2(t), as defined in (1). Consider a random variable (or a set of
random variables), w¯1, that is independent of {xn2 , zn1 , zn2 , z˜n1 , z˜n2 , z¯n2 , z¯n3 , z¯n4 }; and consider another random
variable (or another set of random variables), w¯2, that is independent of {xn1 , zn1 , zn2 , z˜n1 , z˜n2 , z¯n2 , z¯n3 , z¯n4 }.
Then, we have
h(yn2 |w¯1)− h(yn1 |w¯1) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
)
+
n
2
log 10 (109)
h(yn1 |w¯2)− h(yn2 |w¯2) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 10. (110)
Note that the result in (110) holds true when w¯2 is set as w¯2,{
√
P (α22−α21)+h22x2(t) + z′2(t)}nt=1. Let
us define α′21,φ3, α′22,α22 − (α21 − φ3) and y2(t)′,
√
Pα
′
21h21x1(t) +
√
Pα
′
22h22x2(t) + z¯2(t). Then,
by incorporating the result of (110) into (108), we have
h(yn1 |sn22)− h(y¯n2 |sn22) ≤h(yn1 |w¯2)− h(y′n2 |w¯2) (111)
≤n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α
′
21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α′22−α′21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 10 (112)
=
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−φ3 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 10 (113)
where (111) is from (108); and (112) follows from (110). Then, we complete the proof of Lemma 3.
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In this section we provide the proof of Lemma 4. Recall that y2(t), s22(t), x¯1(t) and x¯2(t) are defined
in (1), (14), (16), and (17), respectively. In this setting, we have
h(y¯n2 , s
n
22|w)− h(yn1 , sn22|w)
= h(y¯n2 , s
n
22|w)− h(yn1 , sn22, x¯n1 |w) + h(x¯n1 |w, yn1 , sn22)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J11
= h(y¯n2 , s
n
22, s
n
12, x¯
n
2 , x¯
n
1 |w)− h(sn12, x¯n2 , x¯n1 |w, y¯n2 , sn22)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J22
−h(yn1 , sn22, x¯n1 |w) + J11
= h(sn22, s
n
12, x¯
n
2 , x¯
n
1 |w) + h(y¯n2 |w, sn22, sn12, x¯n2 , x¯n1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J33
−h(yn1 , sn22, x¯n1 |w) + J11 − J22
= h(x¯n1 |w) + h(sn22, sn12|x¯n1 , w) + h(x¯n2 |sn22, sn12, x¯n1 , w)
− h(x¯n1 |w)− h(yn1 , sn22|x¯n1 , w) + J11 − J22 + J33
= h(sn22, s
n
12|x¯n1 , w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h(yn1 ,s
n
22|x¯n1 ,w,xn1 )
−h(yn1 , sn22|x¯n1 , w) + h(x¯n2 |sn22, sn12, x¯n1 , w) + J11 − J22 + J33
= h(yn1 , s
n
22|x¯n1 , w, xn1 )− h(yn1 , sn22|x¯n1 , w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−I(xn1 ;yn1 ,sn22|x¯n1 ,w)≤0
+ h(x¯n2 |sn22, sn12, x¯n1 , w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J44
+J11 − J22 + J33 (114)
≤ J11 − J22 + J33 + J44. (115)
In the above steps, chain rules are used in the derivations. In addition, (115) uses the fact that mutual
information cannot be negative, and (114) follows from the following derivations
h(sn22, s
n
12|x¯n1 , w) = h(sn22, sn12)
= h(sn22, s
n
12|x¯n1 , w, xn1 )
= h(sn22, {s12(t) +
√
Pα11h11x1(t)}nt=1|x¯n1 , w, xn1 )
= h(sn22, y
n
1 |x¯n1 , w, xn1 ) (116)
which use the independence between {sn22, sn12} and {x¯n1 , w, xn1}, as well as the identity y1(t) =√
Pα11h11x1(t) + s12(t). To complete this proof, we invoke the following lemma.
Lemma 10. For J11, J22, J33, and J44 defined in this section, we have
J11 ≤ n
2
log(42pie) (117)
J22 ≥ 3n
2
log(2pie) (118)
J33 ≤ n
2
log(16pie) (119)
J44 ≤ n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + P φ3−φ1|h22|2
))
(120)
where φ3,min{α21, α12, (α11 − φ1)+} and φ1,(α12 − (α22 − α21)+)+.
The proof of Lemma 10 is given in the following subsection. By incorporating the results of Lemma 10
into (115), we have
h(y¯n2 , s
n
22|w)− h(yn1 , sn22|w) ≤ J11 − J22 + J33 + J44
≤ n
2
log
(
1 + P φ3−φ1|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 168 (121)
which completes the proof of Lemma 4.
A. Proof of Lemma 10
Recall that s11(t) =
√
Pα11−α12h11x1(t) + z˜1(t), s22(t) =
√
P (α22−α21)+h22x2(t) + z˜2(t),
s12(t) =
√
Pα12h12x2(t) + z1(t), x¯1(t),
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1}h21x1(t) + z¯3(t), x¯2(t),
√
P φ3 z˜2(t) + z¯4(t),
y¯2(t),
√
P−(α21−φ3)y2(t)+ z¯2(t), φ3,min{α21, α12, φ2}, φ2,(α11−φ1)+ and φ1,(α12−(α22−α21)+)+.
At first we focus on the bound of J11:
J11
=h(x¯n1 |w, yn1 , sn22)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(x¯1(t)|y1(t), s22(t)) (122)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
x¯1(t)−
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1}−α11
h21
h11
(
y1(t)−
√
Pα12−(α22−α21)+
h12
h22
s22(t)
)|y1(t), s22(t)) (123)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
z¯3(t)−
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1}−α11
h21
h11
z1(t)
+
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1}−α11+α12−(α22−α21)+
h21h12
h11h22
z˜2(t)|y1(t), s22(t)
)
≤n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1}−α11︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
· |h21|
2
|h11|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤4
+Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1}−α11+α12−(α22−α21)
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
· |h21|
2|h12|2
|h11|2|h22|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤16
))
(124)
≤n
2
log(42pie) (125)
where (122) follows from chain rule and the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (123) uses
the fact that h(a|b) = h(a− βb|b) for a constant β and two continuous random variables a and b; (124)
follows from the fact that Gaussian input maximizes the differential entropy and that conditioning reduces
differential entropy; (125) uses the identities min{α21, α12, α11 − φ1} − α11 ≤ 0 and min{α21, α12, α11 −
φ1} − α11 + α12 − (α22 − α21)+ ≤ 0, where φ1 = (α12 − (α22 − α21)+)+.
For J22, it can be bounded by
J22 = h(s
n
12, x¯
n
2 , x¯
n
1 |w, y¯n2 , sn22)
≥ h(sn12, x¯n2 , x¯n1 |w, y¯n2 , sn22, xn2 , xn1 , z˜n2 ) (126)
= h(zn1 , z¯
n
4 , z¯
n
3 )
=
3n
2
log(2pie) (127)
where (126) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy.
For J33, we have the following bound:
J33 =h(y¯
n
2 |w, sn22, sn12, x¯n2 , x¯n1 )
≤
n∑
t=1
h(y¯2(t)|s22(t), x¯2(t), x¯1(t)) (128)
=
n∑
t=1
h(y¯2(t)− x¯1(t)−
√
P−(α22−α21)++(α22−α21)
(√
P φ3s22(t)− x¯2(t)
)|s22(t), x¯2(t), x¯1(t))
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
(
√
P φ3 −
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1})h21x1(t) + z¯2(t) +
√
P φ3−α21z2(t)− z¯3(t)
+
√
P−(α22−α21)++(α22−α21)z¯4(t)|s22(t), x¯2(t), x¯1(t)
)
≤n
2
log
(
2pie
(
(
√
P φ3 −
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1})2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
|h21|2 + 1 + P φ3−α21︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
+1 + P−(α22−α21)
++(α22−α21)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
))
(129)
≤n
2
log(16pie) (130)
where (128) results from chain rule and the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (129)
follows from the fact that Gaussian input maximizes the differential entropy and that conditioning reduces
differential entropy; (130) uses the identity that (
√
Pmin{α21,α12,(α11−φ1)+} −
√
Pmin{α21,α12,α11−φ1})2 ≤ 1
and the definition that φ3,min{α21, α12, φ2}.
For the term J44, we have two different bounds. One bound is given as
J44 =h(x¯
n
2 |sn22, sn12, x¯n1 , w)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(x¯2(t)|s22(t), s12(t)) (131)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
x¯2(t)−
√
P φ3
(
s22(t)−
√
P−α12+(α22−α21)+
h22
h12
s12(t)
)|s22(t), s12(t))
=
n∑
t=1
h(z¯4(t) +
√
P φ3−α12+(α22−α21)+
h22
h12
z1(t)|s22(t), s12(t))
≤n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + P φ3−(α12−(α22−α21)
+) · |h22|
2
|h12|2
))
(132)
where (131) results from chain rule and the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (132)
follows from the fact that Gaussian input maximizes the differential entropy and that conditioning reduces
differential entropy. The other bound is given as
J44 ≤
n∑
t=1
h(x¯2(t)) (133)
=
n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + P φ3
))
(134)
where (133) uses the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy. By combining the bounds in (132)
and (134), we finally have
J44 ≤n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + min
{
P φ3 , P φ3−(α12−(α22−α21)
+) · |h22|
2
|h12|2
}))
≤n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + min
{
P φ3|h22|2, P φ3−(α12−(α22−α21)+)|h22|2
}))
=
n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + P φ3−(α12−(α22−α21)
+)+|h22|2
))
(135)
which completes the proof of Lemma 10.
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Before showing the proof of Lemma 5, we describe the result of [38, Lemma 1] below, which will be
used later.
Lemma 11. [38, Lemma 1] Let y′ =
√
Pα1hx+
√
Pα2e+ z, with three random variables z ∼ N (0, σ2),
x ∈ Ω(ξ,Q), and e ∈ Se, for a given discrete set Se, under the condition of
|e| ≤ emax, ∀e ∈ Se.
In this model, emax, h, σ, α1 and α2 are positive constants independent of P , with a constraint that
α1 > α2. Let γ′ > 0 be a finite constant independent of P . If the parameters Q and ξ are set as
Q =
P
α′
2 · hγ′
2emax
, ξ = γ′ · 1
Q
, for 0 < α′ < α1 − α2
then the error probability of the estimation of x from y′ is
Pr(e)→ 0 as P →∞.
Let us now prove Lemma 5. Given the observation y1 expressed in (51), we will show that vm and vp
can be estimated from y1 with vanishing error probability. In this case, y1 can be described as
y1 =
√
Ph11h22vm +
√
P 1−αe′ + z1
where e′,h11h22vp +
√
P 3α−2h12h21up. In this scenario with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, we have
|e′| ≤ 7/5
for any realizations of e′. Note that, vm, up ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γQ , Q = P
α−
2 ) and vp ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
1−α−
2 ),
for some parameters γ ∈ (0, 1/20] and → 0. Then, by Lemma 11, it holds true that the error probability
of the estimation of vm from y1 is
Pr[vm 6= vˆm]→ 0, as P →∞. (136)
In the next step, we remove vm from y1 and then estimate vp from the following observation
y′1 =
√
P 1−αh11h22vp +
√
P 2α−1h12h21up + z1. (137)
For the second term in the right-hand side of (137), the following condition is always satisfied
|h12h21up| ≤ 4× 2γ ≤ 2/5.
Therefore, by Lemma 11, it is also true that the error probability of the estimation of vp from y′1 expressed
in (137) is
Pr[vp 6= vˆp|vm = vˆm]→ 0, as P →∞. (138)
At this point, by combining the results of (136) and (138), it gives
Pr[{vm 6= vˆm} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]→ 0 as P →∞.
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Given the case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 4/3, we will show that vc and uc can be estimated from y1 with vanishing
error probability, for almost all the channel realizations. Recall that vc, uc ∈ Ω(ξ = 6γQ , Q = P
α/2−
2 ), for
some parameters γ ∈ (0, 1/20] and → 0. Let us describe y1 in the following form
y1 =
√
P 2−αh11h22vc +
√
Pαh12h21uc + z1
= 6γP /2 (A′0g
′
0q
′
0 + A
′
1g
′
1q
′
1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, s˜′
+z1
= 6γP /2s˜′ + z1 (139)
where g′0,h11h22, g′1,h12h21, A′0,
√
P 2−3α/2, A′1,
√
Pα/2, s˜′,A′0g′0q′0 + A′1g′1q′1 and
q′0,
Q′0
6γ
· vc, q′1,
Q′1
6γ
· uc, Q′1,Q′0,P
α/2−
2 .
In this scenario, the following conditions are always satisfied: q′0, q
′
1 ∈ Z , |q′0| ≤ Q′0 and |q′1| ≤ Q′0. Similar
to the proof of Lemma 6, without loss of generality we will consider the case that Q′0, A
′
0, A
′
1 ∈ Z+.
For the observation y1 in (139), our focus is to estimate the sum s˜′ = A′0g
′
0q
′
0+A
′
1g
′
1q
′
1. After decoding s˜
′
correctly, q′0 and q
′
1 can be recovered, because {g′0, g′1} are rationally independent. We define the minimum
distance of s˜′ as
d′min(g
′
0, g
′
1), min
q′0,q
′
1,q˜
′
0,q˜
′
1∈Z∩[−Q′0,Q′0]
(q′0,q
′
1)6=(q˜′0,q˜′1)
|A′0g′0(q′0 − q˜′0) + A′1g′1(q′1 − q˜′1)|. (140)
The following lemma provides a result on the minimum distance.
Lemma 12. For the case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 4/3, and for some constants δ ∈ (0, 1] and  > 0, the following
bound on the minimum distance d′min defined in (140) holds true
d′min ≥ δ (141)
for all the channel realizations {h11, h12, h22, h21} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ H′out, where H′out ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 is an outage
set whose Lebesgue measure, denoted by L(H′out), has the following bound
L(H′out) ≤ 192δ · P−

2 . (142)
Proof. For β, δ ∈ (0, 1], we define an event as
B′(q′1, q
′
0),{(g′1, g′0) ∈ (1, 4]2 : |A′1g′1q′1 + A′0g′0q′0| < β} (143)
and define
B′,
⋃
q′0,q
′
1∈Z:
|q′k|≤2Q′0 ∀k
(q′0,q
′
1) 6=0
B′(q′1, q
′
0). (144)
For this case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 4/3, by [39, Lemma 1] we have a bound on the Lebesgue measure of B′,
given as
L(B′) ≤ 24βmin
{4Q′1Q′0
A′1
,
4Q′0Q
′
1
A′0
,
8Q′0
A′1
,
8Q′1
A′0
}
≤ 24β · 8Q
′
0
A′1
= 192δ · P− 2 . (145)
At this point, we define a new set H′out as
H′out,{(h11, h22, h12, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 : (g′1, g′0) ∈ B′}.
By following the steps related to (96), we have the following bound on the Lebesgue measure of H′out
L(H′out) ≤ L(B′) ≤ 192δ · P−

2 . (146)
Lemma 12 reveals that the Lebesgue measure of the outage set H′out is vanishing when P is large, i.e.,
L(H′out)→ 0, for P →∞.
Let us now consider the channel condition that (h11, h22, h12, h21) /∈ H′out, in which the minimum distance
of s˜′, defined in (90), satisfies the inequality of d′min ≥ δ (see (141)). With this result, we can conclude
that the error probability for decoding s˜′ from y1 = 6γP /2s˜′ + z1 (see (139)), denoted by Pr[s˜′ 6= ˆ˜s], is
Pr[s˜′ 6= ˆ˜s′]→ 0 for P →∞
for almost all the channel realizations in the regime of large P . After decoding s˜′ correctly, q′0 and q
′
1 can
be recovered, based on the fact that {g′0, g′1} are rationally independent. Then, we complete the proof.
APPENDIX F
SECURE GDOF OF THE GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL without A HELPER
This section focuses on the wiretap channel without a helper (removing transmitter 2). For this channel,
the goal is to understand the GDoF based on the capacity result of [2], [3], which will be used for the
GDoF comparison of the wiretap channels with and without a helper. For the wiretap channel without a
helper, the secure capacity, denoted by Cno, is given by:
Cno = max
v→x1→y1,y2
I(v; y1)− I(v; y2) (147)
(cf. [2], [3]), where the maximum is computed over all random variables v, x1, y1, y2 such that v → x1 →
y1, y2 forms a Markov chain, and yk =
√
Pαk1hk1x1 + zk for k = 1, 2. Let us focus on the upper bound
on the following difference:
I(v; y1)− I(v; y2)
≤I(v; y1, y2)− I(v; y2)
=h(y1|y2)− h(y1|y2, v)
≤h(y1|y2)− h(y1|y2, v, x1) (148)
=h(y1|y2)− 1
2
log(2pie) (149)
=h(y1 −
√
Pα11−α21
h11
h21
y2|y2)− 1
2
log(2pie)
=h(z1 −
√
Pα11−α21
h11
h21
z2|y2)− 1
2
log(2pie)
≤h(z1 −
√
Pα11−α21
h11
h21
z2)− 1
2
log(2pie) (150)
=
1
2
log(1 + Pα11−α21
|h11|2
|h21|2 ) (151)
where (148) and (150) use the identity that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (149) results from
the fact that h(y1|y2, v, x1) = h(z1) = 12 log(2pie). By combining (147) and (151), the secure GDoF,
denoted by dno, is upper bounded by
dno ≤ (α11 − α21)+. (152)
On the other hand, since the secure capacity is optimized over the random variables v and x1, by setting
x1 = v ∼ N (0, 1) we have the lower bound on the secure capacity:
Cno ≥I(v; y1)− I(v; y2)
=h(
√
Pα11h11x1 + z1)− h(z1)− h(
√
Pα21h21x1 + z2) + h(z2)
=
1
2
log(1 + Pα11|h11|2)− 1
2
log(1 + Pα21|h21|2). (153)
The bound in (153) reveals that the secure GDoF is lower bounded by
dno ≥ (α11 − α21)+ (154)
which, together with (152), gives the optimal secure GDoF
dno = (α11 − α21)+. (155)
For the symmetric case of notation with α11 = 1 and α12 = α, this secure GDoF becomes
dno = (1− α)+ ∀α ∈ [0,∞).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
For the symmetric setting with α11 = α22 = 1, α21 = α12 = α, φ1 and φ3 take the following forms:
φ1 = (α− (1− α)+)+
φ3 = min{α, (1− (α− (1− α)+)+)+}.
In this symmetric case, the three bounds in Corollary 1 then become
d ≤ max{φ1, (1− φ3)+}+ (φ3 − φ1)+ (156)
d ≤ (1− α)+ + max{1, α}
2
(157)
d ≤ (2− α)+. (158)
When 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, it reveals that φ1 = 0 and φ3 = α, and the bounds in (156)-(158) can be simplified
as
d ≤ 1
d ≤ 3/2− α
d ≤ 2− α
which implies that
d ≤ min{1, 3/2− α, 2− α} = 1, ∀α ∈ [0, 1/2].
When 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1, it suggests that φ1 = 2α − 1 and φ3 = min{α, 2(1 − α)}. Then, the bounds in
(156)-(158) can be simplified as
d ≤ max{2α− 1, 1− α}+ min{1− α, (3− 4α)+}
d ≤ 3/2− α
d ≤ 2− α.
From the above results, the GDoF d can be bounded as
d ≤ min{2− 2α, 3/2− α, 2− α} = 2− 2α, ∀α ∈ [1/2, 3/4]
d ≤ min{2α− 1, 3/2− α, 2− α} = 2α− 1, ∀α ∈ [3/4, 5/6]
d ≤ min{2α− 1, 3/2− α, 2− α} = 3/2− α, ∀α ∈ [5/6, 1].
When 1 ≤ α, then φ1 = (α−(1−α)+)+ = α and φ3 = 0, and the bounds in (156)-(158) can be simplified
as
d ≤ α
d ≤ α/2
d ≤ (2− α)+.
The above results imply that
d ≤ min{(2− α)+, α/2} = α/2, ∀α ∈ [1, 4/3]
d ≤ min{(2− α)+, α/2} = 2− α, ∀α ∈ [4/3, 2]
d ≤ min{(2− α)+, α/2} = 0, ∀α ∈ [2,+∞].
At this point we complete the proof.
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